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Abstract
Temporal role-based access control (TRBAC) extends role-based access control to limit the times at
which roles are enabled. This paper presents a new algorithm for mining high-quality TRBAC policies
from timed ACLs (i.e., ACLs with time limits in the entries) and optionally user attribute information.
Such algorithms have potential to significantly reduce the cost of migration from timed ACLs to TRBAC.
The algorithm is parameterized by the policy quality metric. We consider multiple quality metrics,
including number of roles, weighted structural complexity (a generalization of policy size), and (when user
attribute information is available) interpretability, i.e., how well role membership can be characterized
in terms of user attributes. Ours is the first TRBAC policy mining algorithm that produces hierarchical
policies, and the first that optimizes weighted structural complexity or interpretability. In experiments
with datasets based on real-world ACL policies, our algorithm is more effective than previous algorithms
at optimizing policy quality.
1 Introduction
Role-based access control (RBAC) offers significant advantages over lower-level access control policy repre-
sentations, such as access control lists (ACLs). RBAC policy mining algorithms have potential to significantly
reduce the cost of migration to RBAC, by partially automating the development of an RBAC policy from an
access control list (ACL) policy and possibly other information, such as user attributes [4]. The most widely
studied versions of the RBAC policy mining problem involve finding a minimum-size RBAC policy consistent
with (i.e., equivalent to) given ACLs. When user attribute information is available, it is also important to
maximize interpretability (or “meaning”) of roles—in other words, to find roles whose membership can be
characterized well in terms of user attributes. Interpretability is critical in practice. Researchers at HP Labs
report “the biggest barrier we have encountered to getting the results of role mining to be used in practice”
is that “customers are unwilling to deploy roles that they can’t understand” [2]. Algorithms for mining
meaningful roles are described in, e.g., [10, 16].
Temporal RBAC (TRBAC) extends RBAC to limit the times at which roles are enabled [1]. TRBAC
supports an expressive notation, called periodic expressions, for expressing sets of time intervals during which
a role is enabled. A role’s permissions are available to members only while the role is enabled. This allows
tighter enforcement of the principle of least privilege. Access control in many existing systems supports
some form of groups or roles and some form of periodic temporal constraints. This includes LDAP-based
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directory servers, such as Oracle Unified Directory and Red Hat Directory Server, XACML-based Identity
and Access Management (IAM) products, such as Axiomatics Policy Server, some other IAM products, such
as NetIQ Access Manager, some cloud computing services, such as Joyent’s Triton Compute Service, and
many network routers and switches.
This paper presents an algorithm for mining hierarchical TRBAC policies. It is parameterized by a policy
quality metric. We consider multiple policy quality metrics: number of roles, weighted structural complexity
(WSC) [10], a generalization of syntactic policy size, interpretability (INT) [10, 16], described briefly above,
and a compound quality metric, denoted WSC-INT, that combines WSC and INT. Our algorithm does not
require attribute data; attribute data, if available, is used only in the policy quality metric, if it considers
interpretability. Our algorithm is the first TRBAC policy mining algorithm that produces hierarchical
policies, and the first that optimizes WSC or interpretability.
Our algorithm is based on Xu and Stoller’s elimination algorithm for RBAC mining [16] and some aspects
of Mitra et al.’s pioneering generalized temporal role mining algorithm, which we call GTRM algorithm, for
mining flat TRBAC policies (i.e., policies without role hierarchy) with minimal number of roles [7, 8], which
inspired our work. Our algorithm has four phases: (1) produce a set of candidate roles that contains initial
roles (generated directly from the entitlements in the input) and roles created by intersecting initial roles, (2)
merge candidate roles where possible, (3) organize the candidate roles into a role hierarchy, and (4) remove
low-quality candidate roles (this is a greedy heuristic). The generated policy is not guaranteed to have
optimal quality. Fundamentally, this is because the problem of finding an optimal policy is NP-complete
(this follows from NP-completeness of the untimed version of the problem ([10]).
To evaluate the algorithm, we created datasets based on real-world ACL policies from HP, described in
[2] and used in several evaluations of role mining algorithms, e.g., [10, 16, 8]. We could simply extend the
ACLs with temporal information to create a temporal user-permission assignment (TUPA), and then mine
a TRBAC policy from the TUPA and attribute data. However, it would be hard to evaluate the algorithm’s
effectiveness, because there is nothing with which to compare the quality of the mined policies. Therefore,
we adopt a similar methodology as Mitra et al. [8]. For each ACL policy, we mine an RBAC policy from
the ACLs and synthetic attribute data using Xu and Stoller’s elimination algorithm [16], pseudorandomly
extend the RBAC policy with temporal information numerous times to obtain TRBAC policies, expand the
TRBAC policies into equivalent TUPAs, mine a TRBAC policy from each TUPA and the attribute data,
and compare the average quality of the resulting TRBAC policies with the quality of the original TRBAC
policy, with the goal that the former is at least as good as the latter.
We created two datasets, using different temporal information when extending RBAC policies to obtain
TRBAC policies. For the first dataset, we use simple periodic expressions, each of which is a range of
hours that implicitly repeats every day. We use the same time intervals as [8]. They are designed to cover
various relationships between intervals, such as overlapping, consecutive, disjoint, and nested. For the second
dataset, we use more complex periodic expressions based on a hospital staffing schedule. For both datasets,
we use the same attribute data, namely, the high-fit synthetic attribute data for these ACL policies described
in [16].
In experiments using number of roles as the policy quality metric, Mitra et al.’s GTRM algorithm,
designed to minimize number of roles, produces 34% more roles than our algorithm, on average. In experi-
ments using WSC-INT as the policy quality metric, our algorithm succeeds in finding the implicit structure
in the TUPA, producing policies with comparable (for the first dataset) or moderately higher (for the second
dataset) WSC and better interpretability, on average, compared with the original TRBAC policy.
Mitra et al. developed another temporal role mining algorithm, called the CO-TRAPMP-MVCL algo-
rithm [9]. It minimizes a restricted variant of WSC based on the sizes of two components of the policy.
In experiments using that variant as a policy quality metric, and using datasets created by Mitra et al.,
our algorithm produces policies that are 41% smaller, on average, than the policies produced by the CO-
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TRAPMP-MVCL algorithm.
We explored the effect of different inheritance types on the quality of the mined policy and found that
weakly restricted inheritance leads to policies with significantly better WSC and slightly better interpretabil-
ity, on average. We experimentally evaluated the benefits of some design decisions and quantified the
cost-quality trade-off provided by a parameter to our algorithm that limits the set of initial roles used in
intersections in phase 1.
This paper is a revised and extended version of [12]. The main improvements are substitution of FastMiner
for CompleteMiner when computing role intersections and an empirical justification for this, an improved
metric for selecting a subset of initial roles for use in role intersections, more explanation and details of the
algorithm, and more experiments, including an experimental comparison with Mitra et al.’s CO-TRAPMP-
MVCL algorithm [9].
Section 2 provides background on TRBAC. Section 3 defines the policy mining problem. Section 4
presents our algorithm. Section 5 describes the datasets used in the experimental evaluation. Section 6
presents the results of the experimental evaluation. Section 7 discusses related work. Directions for future
work include: mining TRBAC policies from operation logs, by extending work on mining RBAC policies
from logs [11]; optimization of TRBAC policies, i.e., improving the quality of a TRBAC policy while minizing
changes to it, by extending work on optimizing RBAC policies [14]; and mining temporal ABAC policies, by
extending work on ABAC policy mining [17, 6].
2 Background on TRBAC
An RBAC policy is a tuple 〈User ,Perm,Role,UA,PA,RH 〉, where User is a set of users, Perm is a set
of permissions, Role is a set of roles, UA ⊆ User × Role is the user-role assignment, PA ⊆ Role × Perm
is the permission-role assignment, and RH ⊆ Role × Role is the role inheritance relation (also called the
role hierarchy). Specifically, 〈r, r′〉 ∈ RH means that r is senior to r′, hence all permissions of r′ are also
permissions of r, and all members of r are also members of r′. A role r′ is junior to role r if rRH+r′, where
RH+ is the transitive closure of RH .
A periodic expression (PE) is a symbolic representation for an infinite set of time intervals. The formal
definition of periodic expressions in [1, 8] is standard and somewhat complicated; instead of repeating it, we
give a brief intuitive version. A calendar is an infinite set of consecutive time intervals of the same duration;
informally, it corresponds to a time unit, e.g., a day or an hour. A sequence of calendars C1, . . . , Cn, Cd
defines the sequence of time units used in a periodic expression, from larger to smaller. A periodic expression
has the form
∑n
k=1Ok ·Ck B d ·Cd where O1 = all , Ok is a set of natural numbers or the special value all
for 2 ≤ k ≤ n, and d is a natural number. The first part of a PE (before B) identifies the set of starting
points of the intervals represented by the PE. The second part of the PE (after B) specifies the duration of
each interval.
For example, consider the sequence of calendars Quadweeks, Weeks, Days, hours, where a Quadweek is
four consecutive weeks—similar to a month, but with a uniform duration. The periodic expression [all ·
Quadweeks + {1,3} · Weeks + {1,2,3,4,5} · Days + {10} · Hours B 8 · Hours] represents the set of time
intervals starting at 9am (the time intervals in each calendar are indexed starting with 1, so for Hours, 1
denotes the hour starting at midnight, 2 denotes the hour starting at 1am, etc.) and ending at 5pm (since
duration is 8 hours) of every weekday (assuming days of the week are indexed with 1=Monday) during the
first and third weeks of every quadweek.
A bounded periodic expression (BPE) is a tuple 〈[begin, end ], pe〉, where begin and end are date-times,
and pe is a periodic expression. A BPE represents the set of time intervals represented by pe except limited
to the interval [begin, end ].
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A BPE set (BPES) is a set of BPEs. It represents the union of the sets of time intervals represented by
its members
A temporal RBAC (TRBAC) policy is a tuple 〈User ,Perm,Role,UA,PA,RH , IT ,REB〉, where the first
six components are the same as for an RBAC policy, IT is the inheritance type (described below), and
REB is the role enabling base (REB), which specifies when roles are enabled [1]. Bertino et al. allow the
REB to specify various conditions and events that enabled or disable a role. Like Mitra et al. [8, 9], we
are interested only in temporal conditions and therefore consider a limited form of REB, which we call a
role-time assignment. Specifically, a role-time assignment TA maps each role to a BPES. A role r is enabled
during the set of time intervals represented by TA(r). A REB can easily be constructed from a role-time
assignment, so an RBAC policy with temporal conditions represented by a role-time assignment instead of
a REB can also be considered a TRBAC policy.
We consider two types of inheritance [5]. In both cases, a senior role r inherits permissions from each of
its junior roles r′. With weakly restricted inheritance, denoted by IT = WR, a permission inherited from r′ is
available to members of r during the time intervals specified by TA(r). With strongly restricted inheritance,
denoted by IT = SR, a permission inherited from r′ is available to members of r during the time intervals
specified by TA(r′).
A temporal user-permission assignment (TUPA) is a set of triples of the form 〈u, p, bpes〉, where u is
a user, p is a permission, and bpes is a BPES. We refer to such a triple as an entitlement triple. Such a
triple means that u has permission p during the set of time intervals represented by bpes. A TUPA should
contain at most one entitlement triple for each user-permission pair. A TUPA can therefore be regarded as
a dictionary that maps user-permission pairs to BPESs.
The meaning of a role r in a TRBAC policy pi, denoted [[r]]pi, is a TUPA that expresses the entitlements
granted by r, taking inheritance into account. The meaning [[pi]] of a TRBAC policy pi is a TUPA that
expresses the entitlements granted by pi.
3 The Relaxed TRBAC Policy Mining Problem
A policy quality metric is a function from TRBAC policies to a totally-ordered set, such as the natural
numbers. The ordering is chosen so that small values indicate high quality; this might seem counter-intuitive
at first glance, but it is natural for metrics such as policy size. We define three basic policy quality metrics
and then consider combinations of them.
Number of roles is a simplistic but traditional policy quality metric.
Weighted Structural Complexity (WSC) is a generalization of policy size [10]. For a TRBAC policy pi
of the above form with a role-time assignment TA as its REB, we define the WSC of pi to be WSC(pi) =
w1|Role|+w2|UA|+w3|PA|+w4|RH |+w5WSC(TA), where the wi are user-specified weights, |s| is the size
(cardinality) of set s, and WSC(TA) is the sum of the sizes of the BPESs in TA. The size of a BPES is the
sum of the sizes of the BPEs in it. The size of a BPE is the size of the PE in it (the beginning and ending
date-times have fixed size, so we ignore them). The size of a PE is the sum of the sizes of the sets in it plus
1 for the duration, with the special value all counted as a set of size 1.
Interpretability is a policy quality metric that measures how well role membership can be characterized
in terms of user attributes. User-attribute data is a tuple 〈A, f〉, where A is a set of attributes, and f is a
function such that f(u, a) is the value of attribute a for user u. An attribute expression e is a function from the
set A of attributes to sets of values. A user u satisfies an attribute expression e iff (∀a ∈ A. f(u, a) ∈ e(a)).
For example, if A = {dept , level}, the function e with e(dept) = {CS} and e(level) = {2, 3} is an attribute
expression, which can be written with syntactic sugar as dept ∈ {CS} ∧ level ∈ {2, 3}. We refer to the
set e(a) as the conjunct for attribute a. Let [[e]] denote the set of users that satisfy e. For an attribute
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expression e and a set U of users, the mismatch of e and U is defined by mismatch(e, U) = | [[e]]	U |, where
the symmetric difference of sets s1 and s2 is s1 	 s2 = (s1 \ s2) ∪ (s2 \ s1). The attribute mismatch of a
role r, denoted AM(r), is mine∈E mismatch(e, asgndU(r)), where E is the set of all attribute expressions,
and asgndU(r) = {u | 〈u, r〉 ∈ UA}. An attribute expression e that minimizes the attribute mismatch of
role r is called a best-fit attribute expression for r. Intuitively, it is the most accurate possible “explanation”
(characterization) of r’s membership using the given attribute data; it can be shown to users to help them
understand the role. We define policy interpretability INT as the sum over roles of attribute mismatch, i.e.,
INT(pi) =
∑
r∈Role AM(r).
Compound policy quality metrics take multiple aspects of policy quality into account. We combine metrics
by Cartesian product, with lexicographic order on the tuples. Lexicographic order means 〈x1, y1〉 < 〈x1, y〉
iff x1 < x2 or x1 = x2 ∧ y1 < y2. Weighted sums of policy quality metrics could also be used. Let
WSC-INT(pi) = 〈WSC(pi), INT(pi)〉.
A TRBAC policy pi is consistent with a TUPA T if they grant the same permissions to the same users
for the same sets of time intervals. When the given TUPA contains noise, it is desirable to weaken this
requirement. A TRBAC policy pi is -consistent with a TUPA T , where  is a natural number, if they
grant the same permissions to the same users for the same sets of time intervals, except that, for at most 
entitlement triples 〈u, p, bpes〉 in T , the policy pi either does not grant p to u or grants p to u at fewer times
than bpes [8]. Note that consistency is a special case of -consistency, corresponding to  = 0.
The relaxed TRBAC policy mining problem is: given a TUPA T , policy quality metric Qpol , and consis-
tency threshold , find a TRBAC policy pi that is -consistent with T and has the best quality, according
to Qpol , among policies -consistent with T . Auxiliary information used by the policy quality metric, e.g.,
user-attribute data, is implicitly considered to be part of Qpol in this definition. Note that the temporal
part of T strongly influences pi, even using WSC with w5 = 0, because it determines how entitlements can
be grouped in roles.
We refer to this as the relaxed TRBAC policy mining problem, because of the relaxed consistency re-
quirement; Mitra et al. refer to it as the generalized TRBAC policy mining problem.
Suggested role assignments for new users. If attribute data is available, the system can compute
and store a best-fit attribute expression er for each role r. When a new user u is added, the system can
suggest that u be made a member of the roles for which u satisfies the best-fit attribute expression, and
it presents these suggested roles in ascending order of attribute mismatch. This reduces the administrative
effort involved in assigning roles to new users.
4 TRBAC Policy Mining Algorithm
Inputs to the algorithm are the TUPA T , the type of inheritance IT to use in the generated policy, the
consistency threshold , and the policy quality metric Qpol . While reading the TUPA, our algorithm
attempts to simplify the BPES in each triple by merging BPEs in it that represent sets of overlapping or
consecutive time intervals; this is done in the same way as in case (2b) of Phase 2, described below.
In traditional RBAC and TRBAC notation, roles are identifiers (not objects), and separate relations such
as UA (not object attributes) provide information about them. Similarly, in our pseudocode, roles have no
attributes; instead, dictionaries map roles to relevant information.
Our pseudocode uses the following notation for sets and dictionaries. “new Set()” and “new Dictionary()”
create an empty set and empty dictionary, respectively. The methods of a set s include s.add(x) to add an
element x, s.remove(x) to remove an element x, s.addAll(x) to add all elements of set s2, and s.copy(x) to
create a copy of x. The statement d(k) = v updates dictionary d to map key k to value v. The expression
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Rinit = new Set()
asgndP0 = new Dictionary()
asgndU0 = new Dictionary()
TA = new Dictionary()
for u in U
for 〈P, bpes〉 in permBPES(u, T )
addRole(Rinit, {u}, P, bpes)
for bpe in bpes
addRole(Rinit, {u}, P, {bpe})
permBPES(u, T ) =
{〈P, bpes〉 | (∃p.〈u, p, bpes〉 ∈ T )
∧ P = {p | 〈u, p, bpes ′〉 ∈ T
∧bpes v bpes ′}}
function addRole(R,U, P, bpes)
// if there is an existing role with permissions P and
// BPES bpes, add users in U to it, else create new
// role with users U , permissions P , and BPES bpes.
if U , P , or bpes is empty
return
if ∃ r in R s.t. asgndP0(r) = P ∧ TA(r) = bpes
asgndU0(r).addAll(U)
else
r = new Role()
asgndP0(r) = P
asgndU0(r) = U
TA(r) = bpes
R.add(r)
Figure 1: Phase 1.1: Generate initial roles. “s.t.” abbreviates “such that”.
d(k) returns the value that dictionary d associates with key k; it is used only in contexts where d contains
an entry for k.
Phase 1: Generate roles. Phase 1 generates initial roles and then creates additional candidate roles by
intersecting sets of initial roles.
Phase 1.1: Generate initial roles. Pseudocode for generating initial roles appears in Figure 1. It uses a
semantic containment relation v on PEs, BPEs, and BPESs: x1 v x2 iff the set of time instants represented
by x1 is a subset of the set of time instants represented by x2. Note that, for BPESs bpes1 and bpes2,
bpes1 v bpes2 may hold even if bpes1 ⊆ bpes2 does not hold. The function permBPES groups together the
set of permissions P that a user u has for exactly the same BPES bpes or a BPES bpes ′ that semantically
contains bpes. An initial role is created with user u, the resulting set of permissions P , and time assignment
bpes. In addition, for each BPE bpe in bpes, we create an initial role with user u, permissions P , and time
assignment {bpe}.
Phase 1.2: Intersect roles. Phase 1.2 starts to construct a set Rcand of candidate roles, by adding to
Rcand all of the initial roles in Rinit and all non-empty intersections of all pairs of initial roles. In other
words, for each pair of initial roles, if the intersection of their permission sets is a non-empty set P , and
the intersection of their BPESs is a non-empty BPES bpes, then create a candidate role with permissions
P , BPES bpes, and the union of their user sets. BPESs are intersected semantically, not syntactically;
for example, if bpes1 represents 9am-5pm on Mondays and Wednesdays, and bpes2 represents 1pm-2pm on
Mondays and Fridays, then their intersection is a BPES that represents 1pm-2pm on Mondays. This phase
is similar to role intersection in FastMiner [15]. Pseudocode appears in Figure 2. The function u denotes
semantic intersection of BPESs; in other words, bpes1 u bpes2 is a BPES that represents the set of time
instants represented by bpes1 and bpes2.
This phase is expensive for large datasets. To reduce the cost, we allow role intersections to be limited
to a subset of the initial roles containing the roles mostly likely to produce useful intersections. To support
a flexible trade-off between cost (running time) and policy quality, we introduce a parameter that controls
the size of the subset.
6
for r in Rinit
Rinit.remove(r)
Rcand.add(r)
for r′ in Rinit
P = asgndP0(r) ∩ asgndP0(r′)
bpes = TA(r) u TA(r′)
if P and bpes are non-empty
addRole(Rcand, asgndU0(r) ∪ asgndU0(r′), P, bpes)
Figure 2: Phase 1.2: Intersect roles
The subset is characterized using a new role quality metric, called the usefulness-for-intersection metric
(UI metric). It is a weighted sum of four quantities relevant to the usefulness of a role r in intersections: role
size (sum of number of users, number of permissions, and the WSC of the BPES), covEntit(r) (defined below),
permission popularity (sum over the permissions p of r of the fraction of initial roles having permission p),
and PE popularity (sum over the PEs pe in r’s BPES of the fraction of initial roles having pe in its BPES).
For example, consider the set of roles {r1, r2, r3}, where r1 has permissions {p1, p2} and enabled time {pe1},
r2 has permissions {p1} and enabled time {pe1}, and r3 has permissions {p4} and enabled time {pe2, pe3}
(user assignments are irrelevant hence omitted). The permission popularity of r1 is
2
3 +
1
3 = 1, of r2 is
2
3 ,
and of r3 is
1
3 . The PE popularity of r1 is
2
3 , of r2 is
2
3 , and of r3 is
1
3 +
1
3 =
2
3 .
We used a Support Vector Machine (SVM) to find the weights that maximize the UI metric’s effectiveness
as a classifier for whether an initial role is “useful for intersections”, i.e., is used in an intersection that
contributes to the final policy, either directly or via merges. We extended our system to keep track of which
initial roles are useful for intersections, ran the extended system on one small policy (domino), and trained
the SVM on the resulting data. The resulting weights are -2.7357, -1.6484, 2.3417, and -0.6017, respectively.
The signs of the parameters show that, for example, roles with smaller size and more popular permissions
are more useful in intersections.
To control the cost-quality trade-off, we introduce a parameter RIC (mnemonic for “role intersection
cutoff”) that ranges between 0 and 1, sort the roles by the usefulness-for-intersection metric, and use only
roles in the top RIC in intersections. For example, RIC = 0.3 means that only roles whose values of the UI
metric are in the top (i.e., largest) 30% are used in intersections.
Phase 2: Merge roles. Phase 2 merges candidate roles to produce a revised set of candidate roles. It
uses the following types of merges. (1) If candidate roles r and r′ have the same set of users U and the same
BPES bpes, then they are replaced with a new role with users U , permissions asgndP0(r)∪asgndP0(r′), and
BPES bpes, unless a role with those permissions and that BPES already exists, in which case the users U
are added to it. (2) If candidate roles r and r′ have the same users U and same permissions P , then they are
replaced with a new role with users U , permissions P , and BPES bpes(r)unionsq bpes(r′), unless a role with those
permissions and that BPES already exists, in which case the users U are added to it. Pseudocode appears
in Figure 3. The function unionsq denotes semantic union of BPESs; in other words, bpes1 unionsq bpes2 is a BPES
that represents the set of time instants represented by bpes1 or bpes2. We distinguish two sub-cases. (2a) If
bpes1 and bpes2 represent disjoint sets of time intervals, then bpes1 unionsq bpes2 is simply bpes1 ∪ bpes2. (2b) If
bpes1 and bpes2 represent sets of overlapping or consecutive time intervals, then BPEs in them are merged,
if possible, to simplify the result. For example, if bpes1 represents 9am-noon on weekdays, and bpes2 denotes
noon-5pm on weekdays, then bpes1 unionsq bpes2 contains a single BPE denoting 9am-5pm on weekdays.
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Rvis = new Set()
for r in Rcand
Rvis.add(r)
for r′ in Rcand \Rvis
mergeIfSameMemberBPES(Rcand, r, r
′)
mergeIfSameMemberPerm(Rcand, r, r
′)
function mergeIfSameMemberBPES(Rcand, r, r
′)
if asgndU0(r) = asgndU0(r
′)
∧ TA(r) = TA(r′)
if asgndP0(r) ⊆ asgndP0(r′)
// merging r and r′ yields r′, so just remove r
Rcand.remove(r)
else if asgndP0(r
′) ⊆ asgndP0(r)
// merging r and r′ yields r, so just remove r′
Rcand.remove(r
′)
else
P = asgndP0(r) ∪ asgndP0(r′)
if ∃ r′′ in Rcand s.t. asgndP0(r′′) = P
∧ TA(r′′) = TA(r)
asgndU0(r
′′).addAll(asgndU0(r))
else
r′′ = new Role()
asgndU0(r
′′) = asgndU0(r)
asgndP0(r
′′) = P
TA(r′′) = TA(r)
Rcand.add(r)
Rcand.remove(r)
Rcand.remove(r
′)
function mergeIfSameMemberPerm(Rcand, r, r
′)
if asgndU0(r) = asgndU0(r
′)
∧ asgndP0(r) = asgndP0(r′)
if TA(r) v TA(r′)
Rcand.remove(r)
else if TA(r′) v TA(r)
Rcand.remove(r
′)
else
bpes = TA(r) unionsq TA(r′)
if ∃ r′′ in R s.t. asgndP0(r′′) = asgndP0(r)
∧ TA(r′′) = bpes
asgndU0(r
′′).addAll(asgndU0(r))
else
r′′ = new Role()
asgndU0(r
′′) = asgndU0(r)
asgndP0(r
′′) = asgndP0(r)
TA(r′′) = bpes
Rcand.add(r)
Rcand.remove(r)
Rcand.remove(r
′)
Figure 3: Phase 2: Merge roles.
Phase 3: Construct role hierarchy. Phase 3 organizes the candidate roles into a role hierarchy with full
inheritance. A TRBAC policy has full inheritance if every two roles that can be related by the inheritance
relation are related by it, i.e., ∀r, r′ ∈ R. [[r]]pi ⊇ [[r′]]pi ⇒ 〈r, r′〉 ∈ RH ∗. Guo et al. call this property
completeness in the context of RBAC [3]. We always generate policies with full inheritance, even though
relaxing this requirement would allow our algorithms to achieve better policy quality in some cases, because
in the absence of other information, all of these possible inheritance relationships are equally plausible, and
removing any of them risks removing some that are semantically meaningful and desirable.
Phase 3.1: Compute inheritance. Phase 3.1 determines inheritance relationships between candidate
roles, based on the requirement of full inheritance. Function isAncestorFullInher(r′, r) tests whether r′ is
an ancestor of r with full inheritance; if IT = WR, the function avoids inheritance relationships that would
lead to cycles in the role hierarchy.
isAncestorFullInher(r′, r) =
asgndP0(r
′) ⊆ asgndP0(r) ∧ asgndU0(r) ⊆ asgndU0(r′)
∧ (IT = SR⇒ TA(r′) v TA(r))
∧ (IT = WR⇒ ¬(asgndP0(r) ⊂ asgndP0(r′) ∧ asgndU0(r′) ⊂ asgndU0(r)))
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parents =new Dictionary()
children =new Dictionary()
for r in Rcand
parents(r) = new Set()
children(r) = new Set()
for r in Rcand
for r′ in Rcand \ {r}
if isAncestorFullInher(r′, r)
// check whether r′ is a parent or a more distant ancestor of r
if ¬∃ r′′ in parents(r) s.t. isAncestorFullInher(r′, r′′)
// r′ is a parent of r, based on roles considered so far.
// a subsequent role could be placed between them.
parents(r).add(r′)
// remove parents of r that are also parents of r′.
for r′′ in parents(r) \ {r′}
if isAncestorFullInher(r′′, r′)
parents(r).remove(r′′)
if isAncestorFullInher(r, r′)
// check whether r′ is a child or more distant descendant of r
if ¬∃ r′′ in children(r) s.t. isAncestorFullInher(r′′, r′)
// r′ is a child of r, based on roles considered so far.
// a subsequent role could be placed between them.
children(r).add(r′)
// remove children of r that are also children of r′.
for r′′ in children(r) \ {r′}
if isAncestorFullInher(r′, r′′)
children(r).remove(r′′)
Figure 4: Phase 3.1: Determine inheritance relationships.
This function is called for every pair of candidate roles. If isAncestorFullInher(r′, r) is true, and there is
no role between r′ and r in the role hierarchy (i.e., no role r′′ such that isAncestorFullInher(r′, r′′) and
isAncestorFullInher(r′′, r)), then r′ is a parent of r. This phase produces dictionaries parents and children,
such that parents(r) and children(r) are the sets of parents and children of r, respectively. Pseudocode
appears in Figure 4.
Phase 3.2: Compute assigned users and permissions. Phase 3.2 computes the directly assigned
users asgndU(r) and directly assigned permissions asgndP(r) of each role r, by removing inherited users
and permissions from the role’s originally assigned users asgndU0(r) and originally assigned permissions
asgndP0(r). Pseudocode appears in Figure 5.
Phase 4: Remove roles. Phase 4 removes roles from the candidate role hierarchy if the removal preserves
-consistency with the given ACL policy and improves policy quality. When a role r is removed, the role
hierarchy is adjusted to preserve inheritance relations between parents and children of r, and the sets of
directly assigned users and permissions of other roles are expanded to contain users and permissions that
they previously inherited from r.
The order in which roles are considered for removal affects the final result. We control this ordering with
a role quality metric Qrole , which maps roles to an ordered set, with the interpretation that large values
denote high quality (note: this is opposite to the interpretation of the ordering for policy quality metrics).
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for r in Rcand
inheritedU =
⋃
r′inchildren(r) asgndU0(r
′)
asgndU(r) = asgndU0(r).copy().removeAll(inheritedU)
if IT=WR
inheritedP =
⋃
r′inparents(r) asgndP0(r
′)
asgndP(r) = asgndP0(r).copy().removeAll(inheritedP)
if IT=SR
asgndP(r) = asgndP0(r).copy()
for p in asgndP0(r)
// inherBPES is the BPES with which p is inherited by r
inherBPES = unionsqr′∈parents(r)TA(r′)
// if inherBPES equals TA(r), then p does not need to be directly assigned, i.e., p is inherited.
if TA(r) = inherBPES
asgndP.remove(p)
Figure 5: Phase 3.2: Compute directly assigned users and directly assigned permissions.
Low-quality roles are considered for removal first. We use a role quality metric that is a temporal variant
of the role quality metric in [16] that gave the best results in their experiments. We define some auxiliary
functions then role quality.
The redundancy of a role r measures how many other roles also cover the entitlement triples covered by r.
We say that a role r covers an entitlement triple t if t ∈ [[r]]pi. Removing a role with higher redundancy is less
likely to prevent subsequent removal of other roles, so we eliminate roles with higher redundancy first. The
redundancy of role r, denoted redun(r), is the negative of the minimum, over entitlement triples 〈u, p, bpes〉
covered by r, of the number of removable roles that cover 〈u, p, bpes〉 (we take the negative so that roles with
more redundancy have lower quality). A role is removable in policy pi, denoted removable(r) (the policy is
an implicit argument), if the policy obtained by removing r is -consistent with T .
redun(〈u, p, bpes〉) = |{r ∈ Rcand | 〈u, p, bpes ′〉 ∈ [[r]]pi ∧ bpes v bpes ′ ∧ removable(r)}|
redun(r) = − min
t∈[[r]]pi
(redun(t))
The clustered size of a role r measures how many entitlements are covered by r and how well they
are clustered. A first attempt at formulating this metric (ignoring clustering) might be as the fraction of
entitlement triples in T that are covered by r. As discussed in [16], it is better for the covered entitlement
triples to be “clustered” on (i.e., associated with) fewer users rather than being spread across many users.
The clustered size of r is defined to equal the fraction of the entitlements of r’s members that are covered by
r. In the temporal case, each entitlement triple 〈u, p, bpes〉 is weighted by the fraction of the time represented
bpes that is covered by TA(r).
covEntit(r) =
∑
u∈asgndU(r)
p∈asgndP(r)
dur(TA(r))
dur(T (u, p))
clsSz(r) =
covEntit(r)
|entitlements(asgndU(r), T )|
where T (u, p) is the BPES bpes such that 〈u, p, bpes〉 ∈ T , dur(bpes) is the fraction of one time unit in
calendar C1 that is covered by bpes, and entitlements(U, T ) is the set of entitlement triples in T for a user in
U . For example, if the sequence of calendars is C1 = Year, . . . , Cn = Hour, Cd = Hour, and bpes is 9am-5pm
every day, then dur(bpes) = 1/3, since bpes covers 1/3 of the time in a year.
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Our role quality metric is Qrole(r) = 〈redun(r), clsSz(r)〉, with lexicographic order on the tuples.
Our algorithm may remove a role even if the removal worsens policy quality slightly. Specifically, we
introduce a quality change tolerance δ, with δ ≥ 1, and we remove a role if the quality Q′ of the TRBAC
policy resulting from the removal is related to the quality Q of the current TRBAC policy by Q′ < δQ (recall
that, for policy quality metrics, smaller values are better). Choosing δ > 1 partially compensates for the
fact that a purely greedy approach to policy quality improvement is not an optimal strategy.
Pseudocode for removing roles appears in Figure 6. It repeatedly tries to remove all removable roles,
until none of the attempted removals succeeds in improving the policy quality. The policy pi is an implicit
argument to auxiliary functions such as removeRole and addRole. Function addRole(r) adds role r to the
candidate role hierarchy: inheritance relations involving r are added, and the assigned users and assigned
permissions of r’s newly acquired ancestors and descendants are adjusted by removing inherited users and
permissions, in a similar way as in the construction of the role hierarchy in Phase 3. Removing a role r and
then restoring r using addRole leaves the policy unchanged.
When testing whether -consistency is violated, it is sufficient to check the size of T \[[pi]]. It is unnecessary
to consider [[pi]] \T , because it is always empty; to see this, note that [[pi]] equals T at the beginning of Phase
4, and Phase 4 only removes roles, which can only decrease [[pi]].
The following auxiliary functions are used in removeRole. isDescendant(r,r′) holds if r is a descendant
of r′, as determined by following the parent-child relations in the children dictionary. The set of authorized
users of r, denoted authU(r), is the set of users in asgndU(r) or asgndU(r′) for some r′ senior to r; this is
the same as in RBAC. The notion of authorized permissions must be defined differently in TRBAC than
RBAC, because, with strongly-restricted inheritance, the inherited permissions of a role r may be associated
with BPESs different than TA(r). With strongly-restricted inheritance, the set of authorized permissions
of r, denoted authP(r), is the set of permission-BPES pairs 〈p, bpes〉 such that (1) each directly assigned
permission of r is paired with TA(r) and (2) each permission p inherited by r is paired with the semantic union
of the BPESs of the junior roles from which it is inherited. With weakly-restricted inheritance, authP(r) is
the set of permission-BPES pairs 〈p,TA(r)〉 such that p is in asgndP(r) or asgndP(r′) for some r′ junior to
r; we use a set of pairs for uniformity with the case of strongly-restricted inheritance.
5 Datasets
We generated two datasets based on real-world ACL policies from HP, described in [2], and the high-fit
synthetic attribute data for these ACL policies described in [16]; see those references for more information
about the ACL policies and attribute data. Briefly, the ACL policies are named americas small, apj, domino,
emea, firewall1, firewall2, and healthcare. The synthetic attribute data is generated pseudorandomly, using
statistical distributions based on statistical summaries of some real-world attribute data, to make the syn-
thetic data more realistic. The number of attributes ranges from 20 to 50, depending on the policy size.
The type of attribute values is unimportant (the only operation used by our algorithm on attribute values
is equality), so we simply use natural numbers for the values of all attributes.
As outlined in Section 1, for each ACL policy, we mine an RBAC policy from the ACLs and the attribute
data using Xu and Stoller’s elimination algorithm [16], and pseudorandomly extend the RBAC policy with
temporal information several times to obtain TRBAC policies. For each ACL policy except americas small,
we create 30 TRBAC policies. For americas small, which is larger, we create only 10 TRBAC policies, to
reduce the running time of the experiments. We extend the RBAC policies in two ways, using different
temporal information.
Dataset with simple PEs. A simple PE is a range of hours (e.g., 9am-5pm) that implicitly repeats every
day. We define the WSC of a simple PE to be 1. This dataset uses the same simple PEs as in [8], namely,
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pi = policy from Phase 3
q = Qpol(pi)
workL = list of removable roles in pi
changed = true
while ¬empty(workL) ∧ changed
sort workL in ascending order by Qrole
changed = false
for r in workL
removeRole(r)
// if -consistency is violated,
// restore r.
if |T \ [[pi]] | > 
addRole(r)
workL.remove(r)
else
// if policy quality improved,
// keep the change.
if Qpol(pi) < δq
changed = true
q = Qpol(pi)
workL.remove(r)
else
// undo the change, i.e., restore r
addRole(r)
function removeRole(r)
for parent in parents(r)
// remove r from its parents
children(parent).remove(r)
for child in children(r)
// if child is not a descendant of parent
// after removing r, add an inheritance
// edge between child and parent.
if ¬ isDescendant(child,parent)
children(parent).add(child)
parents(child).add(parent)
for u in asgndU(r)
// if u is not authorized to parent after
// removing r, add u to assigned users
// of parent.
if u 6∈ authU(parent)
asgndU(parent).add(u)
for child in children(r)
parents(child).remove(r)
for p in asgndP(r)
// if p is not fully authorized to child
// after removing r, add p to assigned
// permissions of child.
if 〈r,TA(child)〉 6∈ authP(child)
asgndP(child).add(p)
Rcand.remove(r)
Figure 6: Phase 4: Remove roles.
[6, 11], [7, 10], [8, 9], [8, 11], [9, 11], [10, 11], [10, 12], [11, 13], [14, 15], [16, 17]. These PEs are designed to cover
various relationships between intervals, such as overlapping, consecutive, disjoint, and nested. We choose
the number of PEs in each BPES pseudorandomly using a similar probability distribution as in [8], namely,
pr(1) = 0.78, pr(2) = 0.2, pr(3) = 0.02. We choose the specific PEs in each BPES pseudorandomly using a
uniform distribution.
Dataset with complex PEs. For this dataset, we use periodic expressions based on a hospital staffing
schedule, based on discussions with the Director of Timekeeping at Stony Brook University Hospital. The
periodic expressions are not taken directly from the hospital’s staffing schedule, but they reflect its general
nature. The schedule does not repeat every week, but rather every few weeks, because weekend duty rotates.
Clinicians may work 3 days/week for 12 hours/day starting at 7am or 7pm, or 5 days/week for 8.5 hours/day
starting at 7am, 3pm, or 11pm. The probabilities of these work schedules are 0.144, 0.094, 0.284, 0.284, and
0.194, respectively. We create two instances of each of these five types of work schedules, by pseudorandomly
choosing the appropriate number of days of the week in each of the four weeks of a Quadweek, using a uniform
distribution. Each BPES is based on exactly one of the resulting 10 work schedules. Multiple PEs are needed
to represent work schedules that wrap around calendar units; for example, a 7pm-7am shift is represented
using two PEs, with time intervals 7pm-midnight and midnight-7am. The PEs are based on the following
sequence of calendars: C1=Quadweeks, C2=Days, C3=Hours, Cd=Hours. The days in a Quadweek are
numbered 1..28. Including Week in the sequence of calendars is not helpful, because most workers’ schedules
do not repeat on a weekly basis. For example, consider a clinician who works 3 days/week for 12 hours/day
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starting at 7am, working Mon,Wed,Fri during the first and second weeks of a quadweek, and Tue,Thu,Sat
during the third and fourth weeks. Assuming weeks start on Monday, this schedule is represented by the PE
[all · Quadweeks + {1, 3, 5, 8, 10, 12, 16, 18, 20, 23, 25, 27} · Days + {8} · Hours B 12 · Hours].
6 Evaluation
The experimental methodology is outlined in Section 1. All experiments use quality change tolerance δ =
1.001 (this value gave the best results for the experiments in [16]),  = 0, and wi = 1 for all weights in WSC.
The policy quality metric is WSC-INT, and the inheritance type is weakly restricted, except where specified
otherwise.
Our Java code and datasets are available at http://www.cs.stonybrook.edu/~stoller/software/.
Periodic expressions are an abstract data type with two implementations: (1) simple PEs, as defined in Sec-
tion 5, and implemented as pairs of integers, and (2) (general) PEs, as defined in Section 2, and implemented
as arrays of arrays of integers. These implementations are used in the experiments in Sections 6.1 and 6.2,
respectively. Running times include the cost of an end-to-end correctness check that checks equivalence of
the input TUPA and the meaning of the mined TRBAC policy; the average cost is about 7% of the running
time. The experiments were run on a Lenovo IdeaCentre K430 with a 3.4 GHz Intel Core i7-3770 CPU.
6.1 Experiments using dataset with simple PEs
All experiments on this simple PEs dataset use role intersection cutoff RIC = 1.
Comparison of original and mined policies. Figure 7 shows detailed results from experiments on this
dataset. In the column headings, µ is mean, σ is standard deviation, CI is half-width of 95% confidence
interval using Student’s t-distribution, and time is the average running time in minutes:seconds. There is
no standard deviation column for INT, because interpretability is unaffected by the role-time assignment
and hence is the same for all TRBAC policies generated by extending the same RBAC policy. Ignore the
last 2 columns for now. The averages and standard deviations are computed over the TRBAC policies
created by extending each RBAC policy. The WSC of the mined TRBAC policy ranges from about 2%
lower (for healthcare) to about 5% higher (for firewall1) than the WSC of the original TRBAC policy. The
interpretability of the mined policy ranges from about 40% lower (for firewall-2) to about 1% lower (for apj)
than the interpretability of the original TRBAC policy. On average over the seven policies, the WSC is
about 0.5% higher, and the interpretability is about 19% lower. Thus, our algorithm succeeds in finding the
implicit structure in the TUPA and producing a policy with comparable WSC and better interpretability,
on average, than the original TRBAC policy.
Comparison of FastMiner and CompleteMiner. In Phase 1.2 (Intersect roles), instead of the Fast-
Miner approach of computing intersections only for pairs of initial roles, we could instead adopt the Com-
pleteMiner approach of computing intersections for all subsets of initial roles [15]. We ran our algorithm,
modified to use CompleterMiner, on our simple PE dataset, omitting emea and americas small because of
their longer running times. Figure 8 shows the results using FastMiner and CompleteMiner. Surprisingly,
CompleteMiner did not improve policy quality: it increased the average WSC by 4% on average, ranging
from 0.2% (for firewall2) to 11% (for domino), and it increased (worsened) the average INT by 10% on aver-
age, ranging from 1% (for apj) to 19% (for firewall1). Although one might expect that generating additional
candidate roles would only improve the quality of the final policy, the role selection phase uses imperfect
heuristics, so additional candidate roles sometimes lead to decreases in policy quality. Not surprisingly,
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Original Policy Mined Policy Avg |R|
Dataset WSC INT WSC INT Time Our
µ σ µ σ CI µ σ CI µ Alg GTRM
americas small 6975 7.5 189 7098 71 27 138 6 2.2 48:42 296
apj 4879 10.0 385 4813 16 5.9 384 3.4 1.3 0:15 470 527
domino 449 2.5 23 450 9 3 18 1.9 0.70 0:01 29 40
emea 3929 4.4 32 4065 80 30 32 0 - 0:41 99 115
firewall1 1533 4.1 48 1603 80 30 37 3.4 1.3 1:07 93 130
firewall2 960 1.4 7 963 7.2 2.7 4 1.2 0.44 0:02 12 17
healthcare 168 1.4 14 165 1.6 0.6 12 1.2 0.44 0:01 16 25
Figure 7: Results of experiments with simple PEs.
Dataset
WSC INT Time
CM FM CM FM CM FM
µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ µ
healthcare 168 4 165 1.6 14 0.4 12 1.2 0:01 0:01
firewall2 966 9 963 7.2 5 1.0 4 1.2 0:02 0:02
firewall1 1661 64 1603 80 44 3.7 37 3.4 1:13 1:07
domino 500 71 450 9 21 1.5 18 1.9 0:01 0:01
apj 4828 21 4813 16 388 3.7 384 3.4 0:46 0:15
Figure 8: Results of experiments with Complete Miner (CM) and Fast Miner (FM).
CompleteMiner is slower: it increased the average running time by 160% on average, ranging from 15% for
firewall2 to 201% for apj.
Comparison of inheritance types. We ran our algorithm again on the same dataset with all policies
except americas small, specifying strongly restricted inheritance for the mined policies. This caused a sig-
nificant increase in the WSC of the mined policies. The percentage increase averages 51% and ranges from
6% (for apj) to 105% (for firewall1 and healthcare). Intuitively, the reason for the increase is that, with
strongly restricted inheritance, the temporal information associated with directly assigned and inherited
permissions may be different, and this may prevent removing inherited permissions from a role’s directly
assigned permissions. Inheritance type has less effect on the average INT, increasing (worsening) it by about
3% on average.
Evaluation of choice of initial roles. Recall from Section 4 that the definition of permBPES in Figure
1 uses the condition bpes v bpes ′ in order to include in each initial role the permissions that the user has
for a BPES bpes ′ that semantically contains bpes. A more obvious alternative is to require bpes = bpes ′ and
thereby include only the permissions that the user has for exactly the same BPES bpes. Let permBPES−
denote that variant of permBPES. We evaluated the benefit of using permBPES by running our algorithm,
modified to use permBPES− instead of permBPES, for all policies in the simple PE dataset except the
largest one, americas small, due to its longer running time. This change increased the average WSC by 37%
on average, ranging from 13% (for apj) to 85% (for healthcare). It increased (worsened) the average INT
by 50% on average, ranging from 9% (for apj) to 100% (for emea). The average running time decreased by
61% on average, ranging from 31% slower (for firewall2) (the only policy for which the modified algorithm
was slower) to 94% faster (for emea).
The policy quality benefit of permBPES over permBPES− can also be demonstrated with a simple
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example. Consider the input TUPA T = {〈u1, p1, 10am−5pm〉, 〈u1, p2, 10am−noon〉, 〈u1, p3, noon−5pm〉}.
Our algorithm generates a policy with 2 roles and WSC 8; one role has permissions {p1, p2} during 10am-
noon, and the other role has permissions {p1, p3} during noon-5pm. The variant of our algorithm that uses
permREB− instead of permBPES generates a policy with 3 roles, each corresponding to one element of the
TUPA, and with WSC 9. Mitra et al.’s GTRM algorithm [8] also produces that policy, as expected, since its
construction of initial roles is more similar to permBPES− than permBPES. Mitra et al.’s CO-TRAPMP-
MVCL algorithm [9] may produce either of these policies, depending on the value of a parameter, namely,
the threshold θ for degree of overlap.
We also evaluated the effect of using both permBPES and permBPES−, i.e., of replacing the call
permBPES(u, T ) with permBPES(u, T ) ∪ permBPES−(u, T ). This change increased the average WSC by
0.1% and the average INT by 0.2%. It also increased the average running time by 22% on average, ranging
from 7% faster (for firewall1) to 60% slower (for domino).
We considered reducing the cost of Phase 1.1 by removing the first call to addRole. Note that Mitra et
al.’s algorithm does not include an analogue of this call. This change increased the average WSC by 9%
on average over the policies used in this experiment (all except americas small), ranging from 7% (for emea
and firewall2) to 10% (for domino). It increased (worsened) the average INT by 8% on average over those
policies, ranging from 2% (for firewall2) to 12% (for firewall1).
Comparison with Mitra et al.’s GTRM algorithm. We ran Mitra et al.’s GTRM algorithm [8], and
our algorithm with number of roles as policy quality metric (because GTRM algorithm optimizes this metric),
on our dataset with simple PEs. Their code supports only simple PEs, so we used only the simple PE dataset
in the comparison. Their code, implemented in C, gave an error (“malloc: ...: pointer being freed was not
allocated”) on some TRBAC policies generated for emea and firewall1; we ignored those results. Their code
did not run correctly on americas small, so we omitted it from this comparison.
The last two columns of Figure 7 show the numbers of roles generated by the two algorithms. Standard
deviations are omitted to save space but are small: on average, 3% of the mean, for both algorithms. The
GTRM algorithm produces 34% more roles than ours, on average. Our algorithm produces hierarchical
policies, and their algorithm produces flat policies, but this does not affect the number of roles. There are
many other differences between the algorithms, discussed in Section 7, which contribute to the difference in
results. The above paragraph on evaluation of choice of initial roles describes two experiments that explore
differences between our algorithm and the GTRM algorithm and quantify the benefit of those differences.
The effects of some other differences between the two algorithms, such as the use of elimination vs. selection
in Phase 4, were investigated in the untimed case in [16] and likely have a similar impact here.
6.2 Experiments using dataset with complex PEs
Comparison of original and mined policies. Figure 9 shows detailed results from experiments on
this dataset. The original TRBAC policies here have higher WSC than the ones in Section 6.1, because
complex PEs have higher WSC than simple PEs. We averaged over 30 TRBAC policies each for domino
and firewall2, and (to reduce the running time of the experiments) 5 TRBAC policies each for the others.
For emea and firewall1, we use RIC = 0.4 instead of RIC = 1 to reduce the running time. The average
WSC of the mined TRBAC policies ranges from 0.3% higher (for apj) to 76% higher (for firewall1) than the
WSC of the original TRBAC policy. The average interpretability of the mined TRBAC policies ranges from
52% lower (for firewall2) to 0.5% lower (for apj) than the interpretability of the original TRBAC policy. On
average over the four policies for which we use RIC = 1, the WSC is 5% higher, and the interpretability is
30% lower. On average over the two policies for which we use RIC = 0.4, the WSC is 49% higher, and the
interpretability is 1% lower. On average over all six policies, the WSC is 19% higher, and the interpretability
15
Original Policy Mined Policy
Dataset WSC INT WSC INT RIC Time
µ σ µ σ CI µ σ CI µ
apj 16836 159 385 16879 165 205 383 3.1 3.8 1 72:42
domino 1156 49 23 1256 64 24 16 2.0 0.7 1 0:34
emea 5975 99 32 7309 354 440 32 0 0 0.4 41:24
firewall1 3712 97 48 6534 509 190 46.8 3.9 4.9 0.4 324:48
firewall2 1269 37 7 1316 56 21 3.4 1.3 0.5 1 1:00
healthcare 560 35 14 592 38 48 8.8 1.2 1.5 1 11:00
Figure 9: Results of experiments with complex PEs.
is 20% lower. Thus, our algorithm finds most of the implicit structure in the TUPA and produces a policy
with moderately higher WSC and better interpretability, on average, than the original TRBAC policy. The
results can be improved by using larger RIC, at the expense of higher running time.
The higher running times, compared to the dataset with simple PEs, are due primarily to the larger
number of candidate roles created by role intersection (there are more overlaps between BPESs in this
dataset), and secondarily to the larger overhead of manipulating more complex PEs.
Benefit of general PEs. PEs can be translated into sets of simple PEs. For example, the set of PEs
{[all ·Weeks + {1,2,7} · Days + {1} · Hours B 8 · Hours]} can be translated to the set of simple PEs {[1,9],
[25,33], [145,153]}. However, PEs are generally more compact and efficient than simple PEs. For example,
in experiments with the healthcare, domino, and firewall2 policies, which have the smallest WSCs among
our example policies, using this translation and simple PEs was about 5x, 12x, and 14x slower, respectively,
than using general PEs.
Cost-benefit trade-off from role intersection cutoff. We investigated the cost-benefit trade-off when
varying the role intersection cutoff RIC. Figure 10 shows running time and WSC as functions of RIC,
averaged over apj, domino, firewall2, healthcare, which are four of the smaller policies. The trade-off is
favorable: as RIC decreases, running time decreases much more rapidly than WSC increases. For example,
at RIC = 0.5, running time is 70% lower than with RIC = 1, and WSC is only 11% higher.
Benefit of new RIC metric. We evaluated the advantage of the userfulness-for-intersection (UI) metric
in Section 4 over covEntit, which is the UI metric in our DBSec 2016 paper [12]. In experiments with apj,
domino, emea, firewall2, and healthcare, for RIC = 0.4, mining with covEntit as the UI metric takes 2.5
times longer and produces policies with 17% higher WSC than mining with the new UI metric, on average
over those policies.
6.3 Comparison with Mitra et al.’s CO-TRAPMP-MVCL algorithm
Mitra et al.’s CO-TRAPMP-MVCL algorithm, called the CTR algorithm for brevity, minimizes a variant
of WSC, called cumulative overhead of temporal roles and permissions (CO-TRAP), defined by wTA.|TA|+
wPA.|PA|, where wTA and wPA are user-specified weights [9]. Mitra et al. use wPA = wTA = 1 for their
experiments, and we use the same values. In these experiments, we run our algorithm with the following
weights for WSC: w1 = 0, w2 = 0, w3 = 1, w4 = 0, w5 = 1. This means the WSC equals |PA| + |TA|, the
same as CO-TRAP. CO-TRAP is designed for non-hierarchical policies, so we flatten the hierarchical policies
produced by our algorithm and then compute CO-TRAP for the flattened policies. Flattening transforms a
hierarchical TRBAC policy into an equivalent non-hierarchical policy, by adding direct user-role assignments
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Figure 10: Relative running time and relative WSC as functions of RIC.
for all role memberships that are inherited in the hierarchical policy, and then removing the role hierarchy.
Coincidentally, flattening leaves TA and PA unchanged, so we get the same result regardless of whether we
compute CO-TRAP for the hierarchical policy or the flattened policy.
Dataset. Our experimental comparison with the CTR algorithm uses the datasets generated by Mitra et al.
for their experiments with CTR algorithm described in [9]. It is based on the same real-world ACL policies
from HP as our datasets described in Section 5. It contains TRBAC policies generated by mining non-
temporal RBAC policies using Ene et al.’s algorithm [2], and then extending them with synthetic temporal
information containing simple PEs. First, they create 10 sets of contained time intervals (the intervals in
each set are totally ordered by the subset relation) and 10 sets of overlapping time intervals (every pair of
intervals in each set has a non-empty intersection). They create a role-time assignment by pseudorandomly
associating some of these time intervals with each role, selecting from the sets of contained time intervals
and overlapping time intervals with probability d and 1 − d, respectively, where d is a parameter of the
generation process. They generate five datasets, each for a different value of d: 1, 0.75, 0.50, 0.25, and 0.
These datasets are denoted c100, c75o25, c50o50, c25o75, and o100, respectively. Each dataset contains 30
TRBAC policies with different pseudorandom role-time assignments.
Results. Figure 11 shows the average µ and standard deviation σ of CO-TRAP for policies generated by
our algorithm, and average CO-TRAP for policies generated by CTR algorithm as reported in [8, Table 6].
The average CO-TRAP for policies generated by our algorithm ranges from 68% lower (for healthcare c100)
to 19% lower (for emea o100) than the corresponding results for the CTR algorithm. On average over all
five datasets for all eight ACL policies, results for policies generated by our algorithm are 41% lower than
results for policies generated by the CTR algorithm. Thus, our algorithm is significantly more effective than
the CTR algorithm at minimizing CO-TRAP.
It took less than 2 minutes to run our algorithm for all 30 TRBAC policies generated from each of the
ACL policies healthcare, domino, firewall2, and emea. It took less than 2 minutes to run our algorithm for
each TRBAC policy generated from apj, firewall1, and americas large (an ACL policy from HP not used in
the datasets described in Section 5). It took approximately 24 minutes to run experiments for each TRBAC
policy generated from americas small. Mitra et al. report that “each individual run took no more than
24 minutes” [9]. Although these measurements are from experiments on different hardware and software
platforms (our algorithm is implemented in Java, and CTR algorithm is implemented in C), they suggest
that running times of our algorithm and CTR algorithm are comparable.
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Dataset
c25 o75 c50 o50 c75 o25 c100 o100
Our Algorithm CTR Our Algorithm CTR Our Algorithm CTR Our Algorithm CTR Our Algorithm CTR
µ σ µ µ σ µ µ σ µ µ σ µ µ σ µ
healthcare 92 17 279 124 33 287 142 39 281 83 13 265 191 40 283
domino 420 43 627 391 25 631 402 37 632 405 35 625 405 38 634
apj 1813 11 2375 1817 9 2524 1832 9 2605 1799 8 2303 1849 5 2640
firewall1 1109 120 2819 1142 88 3370 1202 110 3432 1076 89 2704 1276 94 3353
firewall2 602 1 941 612 48 941 603 2 941 602 2 947 604 5 944
emea 5542 192 7245 5634 201 7245 5751 193 7245 5385 176 7245 5856 159 7245
americas large 67288 964 94515 69077 795 96020 68108 878 96797 60734 1029 91971 62393 1012 97110
americas small 3616 247 9563 3834 213 10052 4358 264 10446 3321 180 8567 4296 228 10618
Figure 11: Comparison of our algorithm and the CO-TRAPMP-MVCL (a.k.a. CTR) algorithm using the
CO-TRAP metric.
7 Related Work
We discuss related work on TRBAC policy mining and then related work on RBAC mining. Role mining (for
RBAC or TRBAC) is also reminiscent of some other data mining problems, but algorithms for those other
problems are not well suited to role mining. For example, association rule mining algorithms are designed to
find rules that are probabilistic in nature and are supported by statistically strong evidence. They are not
designed to produce a set of rules strictly consistent with the input that completely covers the input and is
minimum-sized among such sets of rules.
7.1 Related Work on TRBAC Policy Mining
Mitra et al. define a version of the TRBAC policy mining problem, called the generalized temporal role
mining (GTRM) problem, based on minimizing the number of roles. They present an algorithm, which we
call the GTRM algorithm, for approximately solving this problem [8]. It is an improved version of their
earlier work [7].
Mitra et al. also define another version of the TRBAC policy mining problem, called cumulative overhead
of temporal roles and permissions minimization problem (CO-TRAPMP), based on minimizing the CO-
TRAP metric described in Section 6.1. They present another algorithm, called CO-TRAPMP-MVCL, for
heuristically solving this problem [9].
Our algorithm is more flexible than the GTRM and CO-TRAPMP-MVCL algorithms, because our al-
gorithm can optimize a variety of metrics, including WSC and interpretability. The importance of inter-
pretability is discussed in Section 1. WSC is a more general measure of policy size than number of roles or
CO-TRAP and can more accurately reflect expected administrative cost. For example, the average number
of role assignments per user is a measure of expected administrative effort for adding a new user [13], and
this can be reflected in WSC by giving appropriate weight to the size of the user-role assignment. Neither
number of roles nor CO-TRAP take the size of the user-role assignment into account.
Our algorithm produces hierarchical TRBAC policies. The GTRM and CO-TRAPMP-MVCL algorithms
produce flat TRBAC policies. Role hierarchy is a well-known feature of RBAC that can significantly reduce
policy size and administrative effort by avoiding redundancy in the policy.
Our algorithm and the GTRM algorithm have a similar high-level structure: they both (1) create a large
set of candidate roles based on the input TUPA, (2) merge some candidate roles, and then (3) select a
subset of the candidate roles to include in the final policy. The algorithms also have many differences. Some
differences are related to policy quality metric and role hierarchy, as discussed above. Some other differences
are: (1) Our algorithm determines which candidate roles to include in the final policy by elimination of
low-quality roles, instead of selection of high-quality roles. We showed that elimination gives better results
in the untimed case [16]. (2) Our algorithm creates more initial roles than the GTRM algorithm. The
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benefit of creating these additional initial roles is shown in Section 6.1. The GTRM algorithm creates
unit roles, which are similar to our initial roles but have only one permission. In particular, an initial
role created by the second call to addRole in our algorithm is a unit role only when P is a singleton set
and permBPES(u, T ) = permBPES−(u, T ); we not expect this to be a common case, since most temporal
roles have multiple permissions. (3) Our algorithm performs fewer types of intersections than the GTRM
algorithm. The GTRM algorithm performs five types of intersections, corresponding to ra, rb, rc, rd, re in [8,
Algorithm 1]. Our algorithm performs only intersections corresponding to ra. We omit rb and rc because
they may create PEs with time intervals that do not appear in the input TUPA and are not intuitive to
security administrators. We omit rd and re because Phase 3 would merge those roles back into the roles
from which they were created. (4) Our algorithm performs more merges; specifically, the GTRM algorithm
does not include case (2a) of the merge in Phase 2 of our algorithm.
The CO-TRAPMP-MVCL algorithm has a different high-level structure than our algorithm: roughly
speaking, it (1) repeatedly generates a small set of candidate roles based on the current set of uncovered
triples and adds the best one among them to the policy, and then (2) merges some roles. In the experiments
in Section 6.3, our algorithm produces higher-quality policies than CO-TRAPMP-MVCL algorithm, as
measured using the CO-TRAP metric which the CO-TRAPMP-MVCL algorithm is designed to optimize.
Our implementation supports periodic expressions for specifying temporal information, while Mitra et
al.’s implementations of the GTRM and CO-TRAPMP-MVCL algorithms support only ranges of hours that
implicitly repeat every day. Design and implementation of operations on sets of PEs is non-trivial. This
includes operations such as testing whether one set of PEs covers all of the time instants covered by another
set of PEs, and handling numerous corner cases, such as time intervals that wrap around calendar units
(e.g., a 7pm-7am work shift).
7.2 Related Work on RBAC Mining
A survey of work on RBAC mining appears in [4]. The most closely related work is Xu and Stoller’s elimina-
tion algorithm [16]. We chose it as the starting point for design of our algorithm, because in the experiments
in [16], it optimizes WSC more effectively than Hierarchical Miner [10] and the Graph Optimisation role
mining algorithm [18], while simultaneously achieving good interpretability, and it optimizes WSCA, an
interpretability metric defined in [10], more effectively than Attribute Miner [10].
Our algorithm retains the overall structure of the elimination algorithm but differs in several ways, due to
the complexities created by considering time. Our algorithm introduces more kinds of candidate roles than
the elimination algorithm, because it needs to consider grouping permissions that are enabled for the same
time or a subset of the time of other permissions. Our algorithm attempts to merge candidate roles; the
elimination algorithm does not. Construction of the role hierarchy is significantly more complicated than in
the elimination algorithm; for example, with strongly restricted inheritance, a permission p can be inherited
by a role r from multiple junior roles with different BPESs, which may together cover all or only part of the
time that p is available in r. This also complicates adjustment of the role hierarchy when removing candidate
roles. The role quality metric used to select roles for removal is more complicated, to give preference to roles
that cover permissions for more times.
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